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The objective of this study is to compare commodity payments under current Federal 
farm policy with the previous Senate and Administration proposals and the recently released 
“2008 Farm Bill Conference: House Agriculture Committee-Developed Concept for a Farm Bill 
Spending Framework.”  Projections of crop revenue and government payments are made using 
historical yield data for each example farm, the county, and the nation; historical price data; and 
statistical distributions and relationships of these yields and prices.  
Using 2007 FAPRI price projections (which are closer to the prices expected in the next 
few years when a new farm bill will be in force), expected Total Government Payments (TGP) 
are almost entirely attributed to the fixed direct payments under all these proposals.  Since 
commodity prices are so far above their “target levels” the possibility of a counter cyclical price 
or revenue payment or a loan deficiency payment is highly unlikely.  
 TGP under the alternative policies follows a similar pattern on the example corn and 
soybean farms and a slightly different but fairly consistent pattern for the example wheat and 
soybean farms. For the corn and soybean example farms in southern Minnesota, the HB-RCCP 
and USDA proposals generate very similar levels of TGPs compared to current policy. HB-
RCCP provides a slightly higher expected TGP than CP for all example farms except for one and 
higher TGP than USDA for all farms. ACR is estimated to provide lower TGP for all example 
corn and soybean farms. For the example wheat and soybean farms in northwest Minnesota, the 
results are mixed. Compared to the other three proposals, ACR provides higher TGP for 2 of the 
6 example farms. Each of the proposals does reduce risk as measured by CV. We note ACR is 
not quite as efficient at risk reduction except for two wheat/soybean farms in northwest 
Minnesota. 
                                                 
1 Olson is a Professor and DalSanto is a graduate student in the Applied Economics Department, University of 
Minnesota, St. Paul, MN. Olson’s email is kdolson@umn.edu; DalSanto’s is dalsanto@umn.edu. Major funding for 
this study came from the Rapid Agricultural Research Fund (RARF) of the College of Food, Agricultural, and 
Natural Resource Sciences.   2
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Debate on the next farm bill has been under way for two years at least. Many alternative 
structures and systems for crop income support have been proposed. Only a few remain under 
active consideration. The objective of this study is to estimate and compare commodity payments 
under current Federal farm policy with the previous Senate and Administration proposals and the 
recently released “2008 Farm Bill Conference: House Agriculture Committee-Developed 
Concept for a Farm Bill Spending Framework.”  The estimates are made for 17 example farms in 
Minnesota which grow corn and soybeans or, in northwest Minnesota, wheat and soybeans. 
  In February, 2008 the House Agriculture Committee sent to Senators Harkin and 
Chambliss, the ranking majority and minority members of the Senate Agricultural Committee, a 
funding framework for the Farm Bill that would reduce funding for the House version to an 
amount that is $6 billion above the baseline. The commodity program provisions in this new 
framework are similar to those in the House version passed in July 2007 with a few differences. 
In this new framework the target prices for all crops and the loan rates for almost all crops would 
be set at their 2007 levels (i.e., as they are in the current law).  As in the July version, the new 
framework would allow individual farmers to decide between a countercyclical price and 
revenue program.  Opting for the countercyclical price program would be equivalent to staying 
under current policy given that the direct payment rates, the target prices, and the loan rates all 
remain unchanged.  The only exception to this is that the direct payment would be eliminated   3
solely for 2016 to provide for budgetary considerations.  However, since our analysis is restricted 
to what payments would have been this year, we do not consider this provision in our 
framework. 
Crop Income Support Alternatives 
  In this study we estimate the potential government payments under the current price-
based counter-cyclical payments and three revenue-based counter cyclical programs: the 
program (HB-RCCP) proposed by the House in its new framework, the Average Crop Revenue 
(ACR) program proposed in the Senate version of the farm bill, and the January 2007 proposal 
by the Administration (USDA). These revenue-based programs are specified at the crop level; 
they are not whole-farm revenue programs. In the rest of this section, we describe these four 
alternatives in more detail. 
Price-Based Counter-Cyclical Payments (CCP) 
  Under the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (what we refer to as current 
policy (CP) and the first alternative in the new House framework), commodity programs provide 
income support for wheat, feed grains, upland cotton, rice, and oilseeds through three programs: 
direct payments, counter-cyclical payments, and the marketing assistance loan program that 
includes loan deficiency payments (LDPs). In the new House framework, the target prices for all 
crops and the loan rates for almost all crops would be set at their 2007 levels (i.e., as they are in 
the current law).   
Direct payments are paid to farmers of covered crop commodities on the basis of the 
direct payment specified in the 2002 Act, 85% of their base acres for the crop, and their payment 
yield for the crop. The payment is made regardless of current production levels and market 
conditions. The Act fixes direct payments for the duration of the Act as $0.28 per bushel for   4
corn, $0.44 for soybeans, and $0.52 for wheat (Table 1). These are the same prices and rates in 
the new House framework. 
Table 1. Direct payments, target prices, and loan rates for corn, soybean, and 
wheat under the 2002 policy and the new House framework. 






Corn  0.28 2.63 1.95 
Soybean  0.44 5.80 5.00 
Wheat  0.52 3.92 2.75 
 
A counter-cyclical payment (CCP) is made if the national seasonal average market price 
is less than the target price minus the direct payment rate (e.g., $2.63 minus $0.35, or $2.35 for 
corn). The CCP is calculated as the target price minus the direct payment minus the higher of the 
national season average market price or the loan rate. For example, a corn farmer will receive a 
CCP if the national seasonal market price falls below $2.35. The maximum CCP per bushel for 
corn is $0.40 per bushel which is the difference between $2.35 and the loan rate of $1.95. The 
total CCP for a farmer is the product of that year’s CCP per bushel, the farm’s payment yield, 
and 85% of the acreage base. 
Under the Marketing Assistance Loan Program, farmers can take a loan at harvest at the 
loan rate set in the Act. Farmers have the option to choose and usually do choose to receive a 
loan deficiency payment (LDP) in place of taking the loan. If the local market price is below the 
national loan rate, the local LDP is the difference between the local market price and the national 
loan rate. If the market price is above the loan rate, no loans or LDPs are available. Under the 
2002 Act, the receipt of the LDP was not conditioned on the sale of the commodity; thus, the 
commodity could be held and sold at prices higher than the price used to determine the LDP 
received. 
   5
House’s proposed Revenue-Based Counter-Cyclical Payment (HB-RCCP) 
The House included an optional revenue-based counter-cyclical payment program (HB-
RCCP) in the bill it passed in July and a revised form in its new framework. This is not a whole-
farm revenue program but a commodity-based program. A revenue-based payment would be 
triggered when the national actual revenue per acre for a covered commodity is less than the 
national target revenue per acre. The national target revenue per acre for a commodity would 
equal to the 2002 farm bill’s target price less the 2002 farm bill’s direct payment rate multiplied 
by the national program yields for each commodity as listed in the 2002 farm bill. The national 
actual revenue per acre for a commodity would equal the national average yield for the 
commodity times the higher of the season-average market price or the loan rate for the 
commodity. If a payment is triggered, the national revenue-based payment per acre would be 
converted to a payment rate for producers by dividing the national revenue payment rate per acre 
by the U.S. average payment yield per base acre under the 2002 farm bill countercyclical 
payment program. An individual producer’s revenue-based counter-cyclical payment would be 
determined by multiplying the national average payment rate for the commodity times 85% of 
the producer’s base acres times the producer’s program payment yield under the 2002 farm bill 
countercyclical payment program.   
Senate’s proposed Average Crop Revenue Program (ACR) 
In the version of the new farm bill passed by the Senate in December, they proposed both 
a program similar to current policy and a revenue-based program based on state-level yields. 
This new program is called Average Crop Revenue (ACR). The Senate’s ACR program includes 
a fixed payment of $15 per acre plus a potential revenue-based counter-cyclical payment based 
on a State’s (versus national) actual and guaranteed revenue for each covered commodity. The   6
ACR program replaces direct payments, the current CCP, and the marketing loan program and 
LDPs. 
Under the Senate’s ACR program, a revenue counter-cyclical payment is made to 
producers in a State if the actual State revenue from the crop year for the covered commodity is 
less than the revenue counter-cyclical program guarantee for the crop year for the covered 
commodity in the State. The actual State revenue is calculated by multiplying the actual State 
yield for each planted, not harvested, acre by the revenue counter-cyclical program harvest price. 
The revenue counter-cyclical program harvest price is the harvest price used under revenue 
coverage plans under the Federal Crop Insurance Act.  
The revenue counter-cyclical program guarantee is 90 percent of the expected State yield 
for each planted acre and the revenue counter-cyclical program pre-planting price. The expected 
State yield for each planted acre is based on a linear trend of the yield per planted acre from 1980 
through 2006 using National Agricultural Statistics Service data.  The revenue counter-cyclical 
program pre-planting price is the three-year average price used to determine crop insurance 
guarantees under the Federal Crop Insurance Act during the current crop year and the preceding 
2 crop years. The revenue counter-cyclical program pre-planting price is not allowed to decrease 
or increase more than 15 percent from the pre-planting price for the preceding year. 
If required, the revenue counter-cyclical payment to be paid to the producers on a farm is 
the product obtained by multiplying (1) the difference between the revenue counter-cyclical 
program guarantee for the crop year for the covered commodity in the State and the actual State 
revenue from the crop year for the covered commodity in the State; (2) the acreage planted or 
considered planted to the covered commodity for harvest on the farm in the crop year; (3) the 
quotient obtained by dividing the actual production history (APH) yield on the farm by the   7
expected State yield for the crop year; and (4) 90 percent. The fixed $15 payment per acre is paid 
regardless of whether a counter-cyclical payment is required under the ACR program or not. 
Administration’s proposed Revenue-Based Counter-Cyclical Payment (USDA) 
The administration’s revenue-based counter-cyclical program (USDA, 2007) is similar to 
that proposed by the House except the national target revenue is determined using the national 
average yield for the commodity during the 2002-2006 crop years, excluding the low and high 
yield years (instead of the House’s use of the national program yields set in the 2002 bill). A 
revenue-based payment would be triggered when the national actual revenue per acre for a 
covered commodity is less than the national target revenue per acre. The national target revenue 
per acre for a commodity would equal the 2002 farm bill’s target price less the 2002 farm bill’s 
direct payment rate multiplied by the national average yield for the commodity during the 2002-
2006 crop years, excluding the low and high yield years. The national actual revenue per acre for 
a commodity would equal the national average yield for the commodity times the higher of the 
season-average market price or the loan rate for the commodity. If a payment is triggered, the 
national revenue-based payment per acre would be converted to a payment rate for producers by 
dividing the national revenue payment rate per acre by the U.S. average payment yield per base 
acre under the 2002 farm bill countercyclical payment program. An individual producer’s 
revenue-based counter-cyclical payment would be determined by multiplying the national 
average payment rate for the commodity times 85% of the producer’s base acres times the 
producer’s program payment yield under the 2002 farm bill countercyclical payment program. 
Base acres and program payment yields would remain fixed over the life of the 2007 farm bill. 
The national yield for determining target revenue would remain fixed over the life of the 2007   8
farm bill and would equal the average yield for the 2002-2006 crops, excluding the high and the 
low year.  
Analysis Data and Methods 
  For this study, we used the historical yield data from seventeen farms in Minnesota 
(Table 2). This individual farm data was coupled with historical national prices and yields and 
rules under current policy and each proposal.  In each year we used a farm’s actual acreage for 
the cropping mix; for the projected impacts, we used the actual 2005 cropping mix.  However, 
for Pennington and Polk farms we had only data on total planted acreage (and not individual crop 
acreage), so we divided the total acreage into half soybean and half wheat (farms in these two 
counties did not grow corn).  The farms had other crop and livestock enterprises, but we focused 
only on the corn, wheat, and soybean crops for this analysis. 






















Cottonwood 1  Southwest  1052  171  40  -- 
Cottonwood 2  Southwest  886  168  44  -- 
Cottonwood 3  Southwest  1041  170  46  -- 
Faribault 1  South Central  1043  182  51  -- 
Faribault 2  South Central  340  186  55  -- 
Goodhue 1  Southeast  149  158  39  -- 
Goodhue 2  Southeast  754  168  41  -- 
Goodhue 3  Southeast  1300  180  43  -- 
Pennington 1  Northwest  1976  --  25  45 
Pennington 2  Northwest  1653  --  26  52 
Pennington 3  Northwest  1758  --  21  41 
Pipestone 1  Southwest  472  147  44  -- 
Pipestone 2  Southwest  170  164  49  -- 
Pipestone 3  Southwest  764  168  47  -- 
Polk 1  Northwest  1663  --  34  61 
Polk 2  Northwest  1612  --  26  48 
Polk 3  Northwest  469  --  26  49 
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Projections of crop revenue and government payments are made using historical yield 
data for each farm, the county, and the nation; historical price data; and statistical distributions 
and relationships of these yields and prices. We used historical yields for each farm, the county, 
and the nation; historical data on prices to estimate statistical distributions of the yields and 
prices including averages, standard deviations, and correlations; and each proposal’s rules for 
calculating payments. Historical state and national prices and yields were obtained from USDA’s 
National Agricultural Statistics Service data. We projected yields based on deviations from the 
yield trend. By incorporating the correlations between yields and prices, we also allowed the 
joint movements of price and yield.  
  Estimates of the future bushel price of the three commodity crops were taken from the 
January 2007 Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) Agricultural Outlook 
(Table 3).  For each of the projections, the simulated crop price was assumed to have a mean 
equal to the FAPRI projection and a variance based on NASS historical price data. 
Table 3. Projected national prices 





In each of the simulated projections, the @Risk program© (Palisade, 2006) was used to 
conduct a Monte Carlo simulation within Microsoft Excel© with draws for price and yield 
coming from the distributions described above. Each farm’s average crop revenue, resulting 
government payment, and the variation in those revenues were estimated. To establish an 
accurate distribution of potential results, 10,000 “draws” were taken from the statistical 
relationships and used to calculate crop revenue and the potential government payments under 
each proposal’s rules.    10
Impact on Farm Revenue 
  To improve our understanding of the potential impact of the most recent proposals for 
commodity income support programs on crop revenue, we estimated government payments 
under the price-based current policy (CP) which is the same as the new House framework, the 
revenue-based proposal (HB-RCCP) in the new House framework, the Senate’s Average Crop 
Revenue (ACR) proposal, and the Administration’s revenue-based proposal (USDA) from 
January 2007.  
Total Government Payments (TGP) under the alternative policies follow a very similar 
pattern on the example corn and soybean farms. TGP follows a slightly different but fairly 
consistent pattern for the six example wheat and soybean farms. To see this pattern more clearly, 
we calculated the relative size of TGP for each farm by setting the TGP for current policy as a 
benchmark with an index value of 100 (Figure 1).  










































For the corn and soybean example farms in southern Minnesota, the HB-RCCP and 
USDA proposals generate very similar levels of total government payments (TGPs) compared to   11
current policy. HB-RCCP provides a slightly higher expected TGP than CP for all example 
farms except for one and higher TGP than USDA for all farms. ACR is estimated to provide 
lower TGP for all example corn and soybean farms. For the example wheat and soybean farms in 
northwest Minnesota, the results are mixed. Compared to the other three proposals, ACR 
provides higher TGP for 2 of the 6 example farms. 
  These averages and expected levels camouflage the variability of the actual prices and 
yields that may occur in any specific year. To understand better the impact of this variability and 
the ability of each proposal to reduce the resulting variability in a farm’s total revenue, we also 
calculated the coefficient of variation (CV) which measures the variability or potential dispersion 
of total revenue compared to the average or expected total revenue. When TGP is added to a 
farm’s total receipts from the marketplace, each proposal’s ability to reduce risk is shown by the 
reduction in the CV compared to the CV from receiving only market receipts. A lower CV 
means lower risk for the farmer. And, assuming that risk reduction is one goal of farm policy, a 
lower CV means a better achievement by that proposal.  
  Using the FAPRI price projections, each of the proposals does reduce risk as measured 
by CV (Figure 2). This can be seen in the lower bars for the market revenue only (MR) 
compared to the lower bars for every proposal on every farm. Although each of the four 
proposals produces a similar reduction in risk as measured in CV, we note ACR is not quite as 
efficient at risk reduction except for two wheat/soybean farms in northwest Minnesota. This risk 
reduction is estimated at current high price levels. 
   12




































































Using 2007 FAPRI price projections (which are closer to the prices expected in the next 
few years when a new farm bill will be in force), expected Total Government Payments (TGP) 
are almost entirely attributed to the fixed direct payments under all these proposals.  Since 
commodity prices are so far above their “target levels” the possibility of a counter cyclical price 
or revenue payment or a loan deficiency payment is highly unlikely.  
 For the corn and soybean example farms in southern Minnesota, the HB-RCCP and 
USDA proposals generate similar levels of TGPs compared to current policy. ACR is estimated 
to provide lower TGP for all example corn and soybean farms. For the example wheat and 
soybean farms in northwest Minnesota, the results are mixed. Compared to the other three 
proposals, ACR provides higher TGP for 2 of the 6 example farms. Each of the proposals does 
reduce risk as measured by CV.  
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